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Plaintiff endorsed certain papers supposing them negotiable notes,
afterwards the principal fled and the plaintiff was called upon for payment. After paying a portion of the notes plaintiff was advised that they
were not negotiable and refused further payment. A suit by the bank to
recover the remaining amount was decide4 in his favor. He then brought
this action to recover the amount paid to the bank. Held, the mistake
under which the payment was made would not warrant a recovery, it
being a matter equally open t6 the inquiry of both parties.
1
Reported in 32 N. R. Rep. 228 ; 157 Mass. 341.
MONEY PAID BY MISTAKE OF LAW.

The subject of mistake of law is involved in confusion and
the decisions of the courts give little hope of the speedy
adoption of a general rule or a decisive victory for either of
the views that have moulded the decisions of judges and
chancellors. The question is one that lies so close to the
border-land of morals that it is more than difficult to decide
-whether the victim of circumstances 'shall be assisted and
relieved or allowed to suffer for his stupidity. It was argued
before Lord Mansfield that all the laws of the country are
presumed clear, evident and certain. But the Chief Justice
replied, "as to the certainty of the law it would be very hard
upon the profession if the law was so certain that everybody
knew it. The misfortune is that it is so uncertain that it costs
much money to know what it is even to the last resort:"
Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 37. Whatever may have been the
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view formerly there can be no doubt that a' present the granting of relief in cases of mistake of law rests in the discretion
of the court, a discretion that must be exercised with the greatest care, but the existence of which it is now too late to deny:
Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S. 260.
While this may be true in equity, it is, nevertheless, almost
unanimously laid down by text-writers that money paid by
mistake of law cannot be recovered back, and the statement
is made without qualification. Indeed, the payment of money
by mistake of law is usually regarded as the last, impregnable stronghold of the maxim, ignorantiajurisnon excusat.
. The subject was complicated at an early date through the
conflicting propositions of the Roman law. In the Code it
is stated that where a person ignorant of the law pays money
which is not due, the right to repetition ceases, for repetition is
only allowed in those cases where what is not due is paid in
consequence of an error of fact: Dig. xx, tit. 29 ; Code Lib. I,
tit. I8, 1. IO; Inst. Lib. III, tit. XXVIi, §§ 6 and 7. Upon the
texts a hotly contested battle has been fought by the commentators; Cujas, Donnellus, Voet, Heinneicus, Pothier and
Savigny contend that no action lies, while the contrary is
maintained by Vinnius, Huber, Ulric and D'Aguesseau.
Voat Lib. 12, tit. 6; Savigny System, 8, 3; Evans' Pothier
Vinnius Inst. Lib. 3,
on Obligations, Appendix 320;
18,
§
I. The former writers
Lib.
I,
tit.
tit. xxvIIi 6; Domat
rely upon the words of the Code and the positive laws of
the Emperors Diocletian and Maximian, while the latter
contend that the right of action can only be excluded by
exceptions founded upon equity upon the opposite side. In
the words of.Vinnius "the mere circumstances of my having
mistaken the law does not alone give you a just reason for
retaining what was not in any manner due to you, and in this
The
case, aelius est favere repelitioni quam adventio lucro."
Civil Code of France adopted the views of Viiinius and
D'Aguesseau: Code Napoleon, Art. 1377, 1356,2052; andwas
followed in Louisiana, Tanner v. Robert, 5 Martin, N. S.,
26o. In Scotland the Court of Sessions held the same
opinion until the decision of Wilson v. Sinclair, in the House
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of Lords of the United Kingdom, 4 Wils. & Shaw, 398. Irf
Spiin the rule was explicitly laid down that what is paid
through ignorance of law cannot be recovered-back: Institutes
of Civil Law of Spain. Also Manuel Lib. 2, tit. 1I,ch. 2.
And the want of unanimity is further displayed in the Codes
of Austria and Prussia: Burge on Conflict of Laws, Vol. 3,
p. 729.
In'the English common law court* the question was further
complicated by the forms of action and the rules of pleadingIn Farnmer v. Arundel, 2 Win. BI. 824, Grey, C. J., said,
that assumpsit would lie where money was paid by"one man
to another on mistake, either of fact or law. In Bize v.
Dickinson, the question was fairly before the court; .the debtor
of a bankrupt, in ignorance of his right, paid the debt without
taking advantage of a set-off to which he was entitled. In an
action for money had and received Lord Mansfield gave judgment for the plaintiff, saying, " Where money is paid under a
mistake of law, which there was no ground to claim in conscience, the party may recover it back in this kind of action:
I Term Rep. 285 ; Lowry v. Bourdieu, Dougi. 468 ; Ancher
v. Bank, Dougl. 637.
Bilbie v. Lumley, 2: East. 469, however, ignored the previous tendency of the courts. On argument for a new trial
Lord Ellenborough 'inquired of counsel whether he could
state any case where money had been recovered back when
paid by mistake of law. If counsel had been prepared with
the cases of Lord Mansfield's time, the result might have
been different. As it was, counsel gave no answer, and the
Chief Justice said that " every man must be taken to be
cognizant of the law, otherwise there is no saying to what ex-tent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried." This
decision has had the widest influence both in England and
America: Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 144;. Stevens v.
Lynch, 12 East. 37. Not only in the law courts, but in the
court of chancery as well: Goodman v. Sayers, 2 Jacob & W.
249; Currie v. Gould, 2 Mad. Ch: 163; Bramston v. Robins,
4 Bihgh. 1i ; Ry. Co. v. Cripps, 5 Hare, 9 o ,c.f.; Livesey v..
Livesey, 3 Russ. 287.
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These cases, however, have lost their importance since the
decision in Rogers v. Ingham, L. R., 3 Ch. D. 35 1, said to
be the modern leading case upon this subject, Brett's Modem
Leading Cases in Equity, p. 65. An executor was advised
that a legatee wpis not entitled to certain interest, which had
been paid to her. The legatee also took the opinion of her
counsel which was the same, and the estate was divided accordingly. Two years later the legatee commenced this action
submitting a new construction of the will and claiming repayMent. It was held that such an action could not be maintained. Relief, said Lord Justice James, had never been given
in the case of .a simple money demand without intervening
equities, Lord Justice Mellish adding, that he had no doubt
that the court had power to relieve against mistakes of law, if
there was any equitable ground which made it under the particular facts inequitable that the party who received the money
should retain it. In Daniel v. Sinclair, 6 Appeal Cases, I8o,
the suit was to redeem a mortgage. The respondent on the
erroneous supposition that compound interest was authorized,
had consented that the accounts should be so kept, and had
ratified them in writing. On appeal before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the overcharge was disallowed,
Lord Monkswell remarking, that the line between mistakes
of law and fact had not been so sharply drawn in equity as
in law. Powell v. Hulkes, 33 Ch. D. 552.
Whatever may be the rule betweeri ordinary adverse
litigants the 'court finds no difficulty in giving relief where
money has been paid to an officer of the court by mistake of
law. The principle was applied in ex parte James, L. R.,
9 Ch. 6o9, where a trustee in bankruptcy was ordered to repay
money.
"The rule," said Lord Esher, "is not confined to the Court
of Bankruptcy. If money by mistake of law has come into
the hands of an officer of the Court of Common Law, the court
would order him to repay it so soon as the mistake was
discovered." The court would direct its officer to do that
which any high-minded man would do: Exparte Simmonds,
16 Q. B. D. 308. So also in Chancery, where trust money in
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the hands of a trustee which had been paid to the trustee in
liquidation by mistake of law, was ordered to be refunded :
Dixon v. Brown, 32 Ch. D. 597; bz re Opera Limited, 2 Ch.
(1891) 154; see" Morrow v. Surber, 97 Mo. 155.
In the United States the rule is not uniform, although the
prevailing opinion supports the strict rule -in Bilbie v. Lumley
(supra). One of the earliest reported cases is Levy v. The Bank
of the United States, decided in Pennsylvania and reported in
I Binney, 27. In an action by a depositor to charge the bank
with the amount of a forged cheque which he claimed should
have been credited to his account, it was set up in defense
that he had waived his right, having said, "if it is a forgery it
is no deposit." "If he had said this deliberately," remarked
Shippen, C. J.," knowing his right, it might have been obligatory
on him, but it was the expression of an opinion of what he was
willing to allow, and being under a mistake of his right, he is
not bound by it." Very similar were the rulings in May v.
Coffin, 4. Mass. 341, and Warder v. *Tucker, 7 Mass. 452;
Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 9 1. In the former the court said
"we are all satisfied that what the defendant said of paying
money from the payment of which he was discharged by law
ought not to bind him." These cases, it will be noted, were
not actions to recover back money paid, but upon promises to,
pay, made under a mistake of law, and are similar in the facts
and circumstances" to the case of Stevens v. Lynch (supra).
The last decision in this line is Churchill v. Bradley, 58 Vt.
403. The defendant was surety on a note paid by the principal with a worthless bank note, and believing himself still
liable signed a new note. It was held that his ignorance was
no defence: Haigh v. Brooks, IO Ad. & E. 309.
The decisions in Pennsylvania have not followed the line
indicated by Levy v. The Bank (supra);'Colwell v. Peden,
3 Watts. 327; Espy v. Allison; 9 Watts. 462. The question
was thoroughly discussed in Ege v. Koontz, 3 Pa. lO9.
The action was debt to recover money paid voluntarily
to the defendant who had claimed it as a debt due his
assignor in bankruptcy. It was decided that there could
be no recovery. "One person is not allowed,"' said Sar-
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geant, J., " gratuitiously to alter the position of another
and affect his rights and liabilities by voluntarily assuming
to understand his own legal duty and paying a claim on
the footing of such an assumption, and then drawing it into
question upon the allegation of mistake of his duty:" Keener
v. Bank, 2 Pa. 237 ; Boas v. Updegrove, 5 Pa. 5 16; Savings
Institution v. Linder, 74 Pa. 371. In Union Ins. Co. v. City
of Allegheny, 1oi Pa. 25o, an action of assumpsit was
brought to recover the amount of certain taxes paid under
protest, the lien of which had been discharged by a judicial'
sale. It was held that the money had been paid without compulsion and could not be recovered back. But the decision
was by a bare majority of the court; Sharswood, C. J.
Trunkey and Gordon, JJ., dissenting. Certainly the case was
one of great hardship, for part of the land was actually
levied on and advertised for sale before the plaintiff paid
the tax. A similar conclusion was reached in Lamborn
v. The Commissioners, 97 U. S. 185, where the lands.
were actually sold and a trustee relying on the validity
of the tax paid a sum sufficient to redeem them. In the
Massachusetts case of The Glass Co. v. City of Boston,.
4 Met. 181, payments to a tax collector were held compulsory and not voluntary and could be recovered back in an
action for money had -and received, the reason for the rule
arising from the authority placed in the hands of the collec-"
tor to levy directly upon the property of every individual
whose name is on the tax list in default of payment of taxes..
See Magee v. Salem, 149 Mass. 238.
In Gould v. McFall, iI8 Pa. 455, the question of the payment of money came before the court on a rule to show
cause why a writ of restitution should not issue. After
judgment and execution defendant voluntarily paid the debt
and costs a few days before a sale advertised. Subsequently
the judgment was set aside. It was held that te writ of
restitution should not. be awarded as the writ is ex gratia,
resting in the exercise of a sound discretion and that justice
did not call for it in this case.
The United States courts have been particularly act\ve in
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enforcing the strict rule both in law and equity. ,The case
that has been most frequently referred to in this connection is
Bank of U. S. v. Daniels, 12 Pet. 32o. The endorsers of a
note protested for non-payment took it up, giving their own
note for the amount with ten per cent. penalty. This penalty
was afterwards discovered not to be due 13y them and application-was made for an injunction to stay proceedings on the
damages. The injunction was discharged, Catron, J., saying,
"vexed as this question formerly was, and delicate as it now is
from the confusion in which numerous and conflicting decisions
lave involved it, no discussion of cases can be gone into
without hazarding the introduction of exceptions that will be
likely to sap the direct principle we intend to appiy. Indeed
,the remedial power claimed by courts of chancery to relieve
.against mistakes of law is a doctrine grounded rather upon
-exceptions than upon established rules.
this course of
;adjudication we are unwilling to yield." See also Elliott v.
Swartwout, io Pet. 137; Railway v. Soutter, 13 Wall. 517;
Allen v. Galloway, 30 Fed. 466.
Still earlier the courts of New York were confronted with
the question. In Mowatt v. Wright, I Wend. 355, although
the mistake might almost have been called a mistake of fact,
the court carefully reviewed the early English decisions and
confirmed the rule that the money -could not be recovered
back. The parties were, however, in this case, bound by a
compromise entered into in good faith.
Similar decision have been made in other States, which
need not .be set out at length: Gilliam v. Alford, 69 Tex.
267; Galveston v. Graham, 49 Tex. 303.; Campbell v. Clark,
44 Mo. App. 249; Smith v. McDougal, -2 Cal. 586; Connecticut M. Ins. Co. v. Stewardson, 95 Ind. 588.
Beard v. Beard, 25 W. Va. 486, speaks both for West
-Virginia and the parent State: "It is now to'o well settled
-in Virginia and this State that where one voluntarily pays
money to another with full- knowledge of the facts, but
under a mistake of law he cannot recover it:" Shiriver v.
Garrison, 30 W. Va. 456; Harner v. Price, 17 W. Va. 523;
Hugh v. Loan Ass'n, i W. Va. 792. In Erkens v. Nicolin,
-To
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39 Mian
4631, where a party under ignorance of the rule
of law Vac distances must yield to natural boundaries
called for in a deed, paid money for a quit claim deed of'
property, which under this rule belonged to him, he could
not recover back the purchase money so paid. "More mischief," said the court, "will always result from attempting
to mould the law to what seems natural justice in a particular case than from a steady adherence to general principles."
In the recent case of Alton v. The Bank, 157
Mass. 341, the plaintiff, an endorser, sought to recover the
amount he had paid upon certain instruments, which both
parties had erroneously supposed negotiable. It was held
that, whether the mistake was one of fact or law, theplaintiff could not recover, it being a matter equally open.
for the inquiry and judgment of both parties, -and the defendant had a right to assume that the plaintiff relied
wholly on his own means of information.
(Cf. Bank v.
Alton, infra.)
While the rule is thus strongly laid down in the States
mentioned above, the contrary is just as strongly maintained
in other jurisdictions. In Lawrence v. Baubein, 2 Bailey's
Law (S. C.), 623, mistake of law was set up as a defence in an.
action on a bond, and the question was gone into at great
length both by counsel and court. The court, however, found
a distinction between ignorance of law and mistake of law,
and concluded that contracts founded upon a mistake of lawought not to be enforced. The distinction taken between,
ignorance and mistake has been severely criticised : Schlesinger
v. U. S., I Ct. of Cl. 25; cf. Champlin v. Latyn, 18 Wend..
407. And is now practically abandoned in South Carolina
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 20 S. C. 317; Keit v. Andrews,
4 Rich. Eq. 349.
In Kentucky it has been laid down that, whenever by a.
clear and palpable mistake of law or fact essentially bearing
upon and affecting the contract, money has been paid without
cause or considerations, which in honor or conscience was not
due and payable and which in honor or good conscience
ought not to be retained, it could and ought to be recovered
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back: Ray v. The Bank, 3 B. Mon. 5io; Gratz v. Redd,
4 B. Mon. 19o.

In Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64, an administrator
brought an action of assumpsit to recover monei paid to
defendant as part of distributive share of an estate, the pay-.
ment having been made in ignorance of the law regulating the
distribution of estates. The court below entered a nonsuit, but
this was reversed above. After stating that the weight of the
authorities was with them, the court continued, "If the authorities were balanced we would feel justified in kicking-the beam
and ruling according to that naked and changeless equity
which forbids that one man should retain the money of his
neighbor for which he paid nothing, an equity which is
natural, which sa.vages understand, which cultivated reason
approves, and which Christianity not only sanctions, but in a
I
thousand for'ms has ordained."
This remarkable opinion has been quoted with approval in
in the recent -case of Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320,
where it was held that an administrator, d. b. it., could
recover from the creditors of an estate the excess which they
had been paid on their claims, over what they would have
been entitled to had all the valid claims been allowed when
presented to the original administrator.
The court relied
upon Northrop v..Graves, 19 Conn. 548, where it was said
"we mean distinctly to assert that when money is paid by one
under a mistake of his right and his duty, and which he was
under no legal or moral obligation to pay, and which the
recipient has no right in good conscience to fetain, it may be
recovered back in an action of indebitatzPis assumpsit, whether,
the mistake be one of law or fact, and this, we insist, may be
-done both upon the principles of Christian morals and the
-common law."
These decisions involved a repudiation of
Bulkley v. Steward, I Day, 133 ; see also Rogers"v. Weaver,
5 Ham. (Ohio) 536; Beatty v. Dufie, II La. Ann. 74. It
is not disputed that a mistake of the law of another State will
be treated as a mistake of fact: Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. I 12;
-Bank v. Dody, 8 Barb. 233; Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 154.
In First Nat. Bank v. Alton, 22 Atl. (Conn.) IOO, the court

